The impact of DACA on the Labor Force: An Analysis on Non-Native Wage Growth by Balta, Chantal
Claremont Colleges 
Scholarship @ Claremont 
Scripps Senior Theses Scripps Student Scholarship 
2020 
The impact of DACA on the Labor Force: An Analysis on Non-
Native Wage Growth 
Chantal Balta 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses 
 Part of the Labor Economics Commons, and the Political Economy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Balta, Chantal, "The impact of DACA on the Labor Force: An Analysis on Non-Native Wage Growth" (2020). 
Scripps Senior Theses. 1747. 
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/1747 
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Scripps Student Scholarship at 
Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scripps Senior Theses by an authorized 






THE IMPACT OF DACA ON THE LABOR FORCE: 









SUBMITTED TO SCRIPPS COLLEGE IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
















Considering the recent efforts of the Trump Administration to rescind the Deferred Act for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), I wanted to explore how this policy has impacted the American 
labor market from its inception in 2012. Specifically, this paper discusses the impact of DACA 
on non-native wage growth. By using data from the American Community Survey from the years 
2000-2016, we will use a difference-in-difference model to see the impact of the policy on 
immigrants recorded in the dataset by using the native-born labor force as a control. Initial 
results indicate that there is no statistically significant impact on non-native wage growth from 
the introduction of DACA. After carrying out robustness checks based on race, age of worker, 
gender, and residence in the three states that house the most DACA recipients, we see that the 
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For as long as America was declared a free country, people from all corners of the world 
relocate to the United States in pursuit of the American Dream for a better life. As of 2017, the 
total foreign-born population in the US is estimated at 45.6 million, or about 14% of the United 
States total population (US Census Bureau 2017). Of the 45.6 million immigrants, there are an 
estimated 10.5 million undocumented immigrants, approximately 23% of the immigrant 
population (Passel, 2019). The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, is an 
immigration policy created by President Barack Obama in 2012 which allows the children of 
families who arrived to the US illegally to be eligible to apply for work permits and a two-year 
renewable protection from deportation, for the children are also undocumented since they were 
not born on US soil. The DACA policy was brought forth by President Obama through executive 
action in 2012, but the Trump Administration has made numerous attempts to rescind the 
program. The Supreme Court has overruled these attempts on a 5-4 vote (Gerstein & Rainey, 
2020), but as of July 2020, the Trump Administration and the Department of Homeland Security 
have been rejecting initial application requests for DACA (Wolf, 2020), which many speculate 
the reason being is for the president to seek new avenues to dismantle the program.  
There are over 800,000 DACA recipients as of March 2020 (USCIS 2020), almost half of 
them live in California, Texas, and Illinois. Research supports the fact that DACA recipients 
have been supporting the US economy since its inception in 2012. Numerous reports predict that 
removing DACA has severe consequences to the US economy, from $460.3 billion in GDP loss 
over a decade (Svajlenka, et al., 2017), to an employer cost of $3.4 billion in unnecessary 
turnover costs, and contributions cuts to Medicare and Social Security by $39.3 billion over a 
decade (Magaña-Salgado, 2016; Magaña-Salgado & Wong, 2017). Seeing that DACA recipients 
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have contributed greatly to the US economy, the question I will explore is how the 
implementation of DACA affects the wage growth of immigrant, or non-native, workers in the 
US labor force. Though introducing new members into the labor market ultimately benefits all 
members of the labor market in the long run, this paper attempts to illustrate if and how DACA 
has impacted the non-native workers’ wage growth.  
I predict that the implementation of DACA would not significantly affect the wage 
growth of non-natives already in the labor market, mainly because the proportion of DACA 
recipients to the total immigrant workforce is small and the movement of the undocumented 
workers would not have such a significant impact. I will be using the term non-native and 
immigrant interchangeably throughout this paper, and I assume that there is no technical 
difference between the two words. We will test the hypothesis that the introduction of DACA has 
cause a decrease in the wage growth of non-native workers. Despite all the economic 
contributions by undocumented workers described in reports such as the reports mentioned 
earlier, if the policy does not harm the existing non-native (immigrant) workers, then this paper 
will give reason further to the US government on why they would want to preserve this policy.  
We will use previous literature to support the claim that a relatively minute positive labor 
supply shock does not significantly nor negatively affect the native workers, hence justification 
of using natives as the control. I say relatively minute because this labor shock would most likely 
entail an internal migration to which undocumented immigrants that obtain work permits would 
now compete in the same labor market as documented immigrants. The economy and the labor 
market participants will eventually reap the benefits, as attributed to the effects of immigration 
surplus, or the native worker’s total gains from immigration. This policy should give no different 
effect. If DACA does not hurt our native workers or naturalized workers, then this will not be 
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sufficient justification for its removal. This policy is aimed to incentivize children of 
undocumented parents to obtain a work permit and receive temporary immunity to deportation. 
Theoretically, they can either join the labor force in the low-skilled market or use the permit as 
an opportunity go to school and gain skills to join the labor force in the high-skilled market.  
This paper will focus on the scenario where undocumented immigrants use DACA to 
gain a work permit and enter the labor force as soon as the permit is granted, beginning at the 
policy’s implementation. To explore this question, I will be using individual level data from the 
American Community Survey from the years 2000-2016. Using a difference-in-difference 
model, I will be analyzing the effect of the DACA policy implementation on wage growth of the 
non-native labor force using the native-born workers as a control group. Furthermore, we will 
see how this impact differs between men and women immigrants, between white and black 
immigrants, between workers under the age of 30 and 45, and control for the states that house a 
large number of DACA recipients. 
 The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. Section II will discuss related papers. 
Section III consists of the theory and model. Section IV will discuss the data, including 
descriptive statistics. After establishing our model, Section V will discuss the results. Section VI 
will discuss the results and conclude the paper. Section VII will list all the references, and 
Section VIII will consist of all the tables and graphs. 
II. Literature Review  
There exists plenty of economic reports on the impact of DACA on those who applied 
and got accepted into the program. This section will explore how immigration and immigration 
policies in the past have displayed patterns of results that we could anticipate and apply to the 
effects of DACA. The literature review will cover the following: consequences of removal of 
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immigration policies on the labor market; labor market composition with documented and 
undocumented immigrants; immigrant labor force participation impact on native, naturalized 
citizen, and undocumented wage; and other factors determining immigrant wage. 
Consequences of Removal of Immigration Policies on the Labor Market 
Historical streams and shocks of immigration have benefitted the entire economy in the 
long-run, and immigration restriction is more likely to be detrimental than protective for US 
citizens (Caplan, 2008, Stark & Byra, 2020). Through a judicial perspective, tax and transfer 
policies are more effective than immigration restrictions as instruments for raising the after-tax 
incomes of the least skilled native workers. Immigration restrictions may result in a greater 
economic burden to protect native workers from immigrant competition instead of promoting 
distributive justice (Chang, 2008). Orrenius and Zavodny (2015) analyze the effect of Temporary 
Protected Status (TPS) which is currently provided to 300,000 immigrants. Most TPS 
Beneficiaries are undocumented prior to receiving TPS, and their results suggest that TPS 
eligibility leads to higher employment rates among immigrant women and higher earnings 
among immigrant men. The results of this study also have implications for programs that allow 
unauthorized immigrants to receive temporary permission to remain and work in the US. In the 
context of this research, the removal of DACA (and the supply of labor by the DACA recipients) 
would result in the remaining workers of the labor market to suffer more than benefit.  
Not only would immigration restriction harm the earnings of American people, but it 
would also affect the stream of government revenue. Brannon and McGee (2019) in their paper 
estimate the economic impact of DACA in educational attainment, earnings, and federal tax 
payments on both the broader American labor force and the US economy. To do so, they 
constructed two models, one that assumed DACA to be permanent, and another which assumed 
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DACA to be terminated at the end of 2019. This paper supports the claim that eliminating 
DACA will not be beneficial to the US economy, primarily in the form of lost income and lost 
federal, state, and local tax revenue. Brannon argues that revoking DACA will hurt low-to-
moderate income workers, increase competition for all kinds of jobs with tendencies to have an 
excess supply of workers, and reduce the supply of employable skilled workers where it has the 
most acute labor shortage.  
Labor Market Composition 
About 55 percent of DACA recipients are currently employed, amounting to about 
382,000 workers, or 0.25 percent of all U.S. workers (Zong et al., 2017). Borjas (2017) explains 
that undocumented men have a higher labor participation percentage than native or legal 
immigrants. The labor supply of undocumented men is more inelastic than that of other groups – 
meaning if there was a change in the labor supply of undocumented men, there would be sizeable 
effects on immigrant wage. In his 1987 paper, Borjas discovers that immigrants tend to be 
substitutes for some labor market groups (low skilled versus high skilled) and complements for 
others. We see that immigrants are integrated in all aspects of the labor market, regardless of 
skill level. Therefore, if a negative shock were to occur on the labor supply of immigrants, there 
would be some degree of effect to all sectors of the US labor economy. The influx of immigrants 
to the United States, an economically wealthy country, has been balanced between college and 
non-college educated workers. Because of this composition, the US will not experience 
substantiable general equilibrium effects on relative and absolute wage. There is no labor market 




Borjas (1995) in his paper talks about the ways that natives benefit from immigration due 
to production complements between immigrant workers and other factors of production. With 
the results procured in the paper, Borjas predicts that the economic benefits could be increased 
considerably if the US pursued an immigration policy that attracts a more skilled immigrant 
flow. DACA, by means of a work permit, allows the opportunity for undocumented immigrants 
to attend school, thereby gaining more skills that can be integrated in the labor market without 
fear of deportation.  
Though the presence of undocumented immigrants makes its effect tangible to those 
already participating in the labor market, its effect does not affect the entirety of the labor supply 
of all types of immigrants. Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli (2008) analyze the impact of 
undocumented workers using data from the state of Georgia, and they find that a greater share of 
undocumented workers in an industry has a statistically significant impact on the wages of 
documented workers. Altonji and Card (1991) infer that there exists a modest degree of 
competition between the less-skilled natives and immigrants, to which there is an increase in the 
labor supply of the market with less skilled natives by immigrants. However, they mention that 
its practical impact is much smaller since the size of the undocumented workforce is 
disproportional to the documented workforce. Additionally, due to its limited size, the labor 
supply of undocumented workers much more inelastic, and therefore the ones who would suffer 
the most displacement in employment would be fellow undocumented workers rather than 
documented. Since the DACA population is a small portion of the non-native labor force (Zong 
et al., 2019), we do not expect to see a large magnitude of a wage impact.  




Borjas and Cassidy (2019) examine the determinants of the wage penalty in 
undocumented immigrants, defined as the wage gap between undocumented and legal 
immigrants. They find that the wage penalty falls when legal restrictions on the employment of 
undocumented immigrants are relaxed. Additionally, the wage penalty responds to increases in 
number of undocumented workers in labor market, with penalty higher in states with larger 
undocumented populations (Borjas & Cassidy, 2019). Pedace (1998) explores the impact of male 
immigration on the wages and employment of native-born workers. By using explicit controls for 
native net internal migration, (and in a later paper controls for occupational-based migration), the 
actual impact of immigration on wages and employment of native-born workers continue to be 
insignificant or small. However, the increase in supply of immigrants have a sizable impact on 
earnings of other immigrants (Borjas, 1987; Pedace, 2006). Although this paper will not track 
migratory patterns of immigrants, we proceed with the assumption that immigration has little to 
no effect on wages or employment of native-born workers. 
Card (1997) uses 1990 Census data in his paper to examine impacts of immigrant inflows 
on the labor market opportunities for natives and older immigrants. His paper discovers that 
inflows of new immigrants have relatively small effects on wage structure among natives and 
earlier immigrants, though inflows of new immigrants are associated with lower employment 
rates among natives and earlier immigrants. 
Other Factors Impacting Immigrant Wage 
Chiswick (1991) investigated the earnings of immigrants based on English language 
fluency. Using special survey data of over 800 immigrants, he analyzes the importance of 
speaking fluency at migration and English reading fluency. Both English speaking and English 
reading fluency increase with duration in the US. In this study, Chiswick finds that the increase 
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in these factors are most effectively brought on by more schooling and for those who are not 
Hispanic. Reading fluency is more important than speaking fluency as determinant of earnings. 
Chiswick et al. (2009) estimates which immigrants are in what respective occupation based on 
years of schooling and proficiency of English. Additionally, Chiswick finds that foreign labor 
market experience has a negative impact on current occupational status.  
Another potential factor in determining immigrant wage may be region-based; 
immigrants that arrive may want to assimilate themselves in an area where their ethnicity has 
established, also known as an ethnic enclave. Chowdhury and Pedace (2007) examined how 
immigrant enclaves affected labor market outcomes, focusing on the state of California. They 
discovered that any potential positive enclave effects are likely to be offset by negative labor 
market competition effects, but after controlling for metro area-specific effects, enclave effects 
become insignificant. This finding is important since in this paper, we will be both controlling 
for regional fixed-effects and focus on states with large DACA recipients on immigrant wage 
growth.  
After reading through this literature, we learn that immigrant assimilation is not static- 
some papers find that some immigrant groups assimilate more quickly or more slowly depending 
on the factors the papers choose to focus on (Anderson & Huang, 2019). Literature on immigrant 
wage growth leading to labor market assimilation, where the wages, employment, and 
occupational selection of native and non-native workers become similar over time, primarily 
focus on one of two factors. First, the aspects of wage growth that is influenced by individual 
level factors such as age, English speaking and reading abilities, and country of origin. Second, 
an effect of an immigration policy on the ability for immigrants, both documented and 
undocumented, to obtain a higher wage over time. This paper will be focusing on the latter, 
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while using literature to include what individual factors are usually counted in the model of 
predicting wage growth, to see the effect of DACA on non-native wage growth.  
III. Theory and Model 
DACA, or Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, was an executive action by President 
Barack Obama implemented August 2012 which allows some individuals with unlawful 
presence in the US after being brought to the country as children to receive a renewable two-year 
period of deferred action and deportation and become eligible for a work permit in the U.S. This 
policy is very similar to the DREAM act, which has struggled to be implemented over the years 
since its early idea in 2001. Through DACA, people under the age of 31 under undocumented 
immigration status are eligible to apply for institutions for higher learning or obtain a work 
permit. Unlike DREAM, DACA does not provide a road to citizenship. Regardless, if more 
undocumented immigrants pursued an education, we would see a great increase in the skilled 
labor market, where they would be getting a higher wage.  
Because of DACA, we would see one of two things happen in the labor force. DACA, in 
the policy’s nature, is primarily valuable for those young and thus not yet in the labor force, so 
we would see the effects of DACA on the labor market with a delay. Here, because 
undocumented immigrants are incentivized and not penalized for pursuing higher education, we 
would see a positive shock to the skilled labor market, mostly comprised of native workers. 
Incentives to increase education are influenced by the wage structure of the current labor market, 
which is in turn affected by the entry of immigrant workers (Chiswick, 1989; Chiswick et al., 
1992). Another effect of DACA is that people who do not have citizenship or work-visa status 
are eligible to apply for a work-permit. Applicants who have determined that the opportunity 
cost of education is higher than entering the labor market will participate in the labor force at the 
13 
 
skill level that they possess. Unless recipients received education or other formal training prior to 
entrance of the job market, we assume that their skill level is appropriate for the low-skilled job 
market. This would primarily impact workers, mostly immigrants, in the low-skilled labor 
market, where there will be an increase in the supply of low-skilled laborers because of the 
entrance of DACA applicants.  
DACA was implemented in 2012 but most likely see effects after 2016; however, as 
explained in the data section, this will not be possible since we only have data up to 2016. 
Additionally, our data is limited to data prior to 2016 because 1) we can contextualize the effects 
during the Obama administration and 2) we observe the undocumented workers that use DACA 
to obtain the work permit and enter the labor force in lieu of pursuing education. Although we 
are not able to observe the effects of this policy on career paths for undocumented immigrants 
specifically, we can gauge the effects of the policy that target immigrants in their labor market.  
To illustrate if there is an impact on non-native wages, we will be using a difference-in-
difference (DD) model, making the year 2012 the treatment variable, non-native workers the 
treatment group, and native workers the control group. After accounting for other factors that 
may impact wages, the DD analysis captures if DACA had a significant impact on wages. The 
primary regression uses log wage to capture the percentage change of wages. 
Ln(wage)it = β0 + β1 * (2012 Dummy) + β2 *(Immigrant Dummy) + β3*(2012 x Immigrant 
Dummy) + β4 * Xit + ε     (1)                                         
β3 is the coefficient of interest as it captures the impact of the program on immigrant 
wage outcomes. β1 will pose as the treatment of DACA enactment, and β2 will identify the 
treatment group as immigrants and their log wage growth. The Xit variable is all the control 
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variables utilized in the regression: age, age squared, female dummy, married dummy, highest 
level of education dummies (some college, high school degree or GED, or college degree), speak 
English dummy, regional controls, industry controls, and state controls. I controlled for time 
effects by using a trend variable instead of year dummies. Our target is looking at the interaction 
of someone who is an immigrant and affected by the policy implementation. Furthermore, we 
can interact each control variable with the immigrant dummy to see if the variation in the log 
wages can be explained further by the interactions generated. All models following the original 
model will be different forms of robustness checks to see if our initial model holds under 
different sample compositions. With this model, we aspire to describe the effect of the impact of 
DACA on non-native wage growth. 
IV. Data 
I will be using data from the American Community Survey (ACS), which is an ongoing 
cross-sectional survey that provides information on social, housing, and economic characteristic 
data to about 3.5 million household addresses, including labor force estimates. In this dataset, on 
a yearly sample basis, we will be looking at 10,000 households each year from 2000-2016, with 
approximately 23,000 people questioned per year for an initial total of 376,360 observations. 
Since we are only looking at observations who participate in the labor force, our total 
observation count has decreased to 222,702 (approximately 40% of our sample was not in the 
labor force or unemployed at time of survey). 
 We see that after the implementation of DACA, the log wages of non-natives (and 
natives) steadily increase, which may be an effect attributed to the market recovery after the 




Cleaning the Data 
We will be predicting log wages to trace wage growth. To do so, I took the variable 
incwage (income and wage salary based of wage, tips, etc. of the previous year) and divided it by 
weeksworked (the number of weeks worked in the previous year) to get a rough weekly wage for 
each observation. By taking the natural log of the general weekly wage, we are presented with 
our dependent variable lwage. This has its setbacks; it may be the case that a person works 
sporadically throughout the year, such as taking a seasonal job, or they are in-between temporary 
work with a temp agency. We proceed with this definition with the data we have so that the 
variation in the dependent variable can be explained with the other factors in the regression. 
When extracting the variable industry, each industry has an associated code. If the 
regression were run with each individual industry as an independent variable, the lwage variable 
would be completely explained by all the industries. The ACS has categorized these codes based 
on these broad industries: agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining; wholesale trade; 
retail trade; transportation and warehousing, utilities; information; finance and insurance, real 
estate and rental and leasing; professional, scientific, and management, and administration and 
waste management services; educational services, healthcare and social assistance; arts, 
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entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services; other services except public 
administration; public administration; and active duty military. Thus, in order to disable the 
variable in completely explaining the variation in lwage, we grouped them together based on the 
general industry codes from the ACS. 
I created a dummy variable for immigrants to which I categorized all non-natives to the 
US as “immigrants”, grouping the people who were born abroad to US parents also as “natives”. 
The ACS does have its shortcomings. According to a study by Van Hook and Bachmeier (2013), 
the ACS does a poor job of reporting an accurate count of citizenship status, specifically 
naturalized citizens. Misreporting is concentrated for those originating for Mexico, and Patel and 
Vella (2012) say for applications that use citizenship as an indicator of legal status, it’s 
recommended that self-reported data on citizenship be accepted at face value for all groups 
except those with less than five years of U.S. residence and Mexican men. Since DACA was 
designed to protect those who are young and undocumented that want to pursue higher 
education, it is reasonable to understand why the participants of the study may want to withhold 
information for self-preservation. Because of this noise in our regression input, our output may 
not necessarily describe our target of documented non-natives employed. Although the study was 
conducted in 2013, the ACS does not report to have changed its classifications of citizenship 
with the more recent versions of its surveys.  
Within this dataset, reporting does not allow for the assignment of unrelated subfamilies 
within the household, to which all unrelated members are categorized as unrelated individuals. 
Reason for including it in the regression is that household size may be affecting income, to 
which in our construction of lwage (comprising of income/wage divided by hours worked), may 
reflect. Additionally, we would want to include years in the USA (yrusa1) as it may have a 
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positive relationship with wage growth; however, it may cause multicollinearity issues with the 
age variable. Perhaps in future studies, we would like to account for the length of an immigrant 
stay in the US in predicting wage growth.  
Variables that were missing many inputs in this dataset that we would have like to 
include are the education of the father and mother, as it may influence the child’s industry 
entrance and hence its wage, where parents education levels are positively correlated with the 
child’s earnings (Yoon et al., 2015). 
Looking at the table of summary statistics (Table 1, Section VIII – Tables and Graphs), 
we can see that we have significantly less observations that are immigrants than native-born for 
both 2010 and 2014. The mean weekly wage for immigrants is higher than the natives, though in 
both years the immigrants have a larger standard deviation than the native workers. This result 
may also be the result of there being significantly less observations for immigrants in both years. 
Immigrants are more likely to be married than natives, and they are more likely to have obtained 
a college degree than natives in both years. 
Regarding industry, it may be the case that natives may be concentrated in certain 
occupations that require different higher skills that non-natives may or may not have. Labor 
market composition may vary between industries depending on the skillset required and what is 
the majority demographic of the group that possesses said skill. However, in our sample set, we 
see that the distribution between natives and non-natives are very similar (Table 2). This means 
that there does not exist a certain general industry that one group will be more likely to occupy 






V. Results  
All the regressions run in this section have been done so with robust standard errors. 
Initially, I used immigrants as an interaction term with all the independent variables I will be 
regressing. I will also utilize this interaction method so we can see how each independent 
variable affects log wage when it comes to those who are immigrants. Looking at the interaction 
between immigrant and year 2012, we see that there does not exist a statistically significant 
coefficient that impacts log hourly wages (Table 3). This shows that the policy implementation 
had no sizable effect on wage growth for the immigrant population participating in the labor 
force while controlling for all other variables. The output also controls for industry and region. 
Perhaps the reason why we see no significant coefficient is due to how recent the policy has been 
implemented. We only have four years of data after DACA’s inception, so it may be the case the 
policy has not had enough time to work its effect on the labor market. 
The following section of results will be variants of robustness checks to see if these 
results of insignificance still hold. These checks will run the regression model that will analyze 
differences with respect to gender, race, wage growth for individuals in either California, Texas, 
or Illinois, and varying ages in the workforce. Once robustness check that would also be 
interesting to look at is if there exists a difference in wage growth between when the policy was 
announced versus when the policy was formally implemented. Because this policy was both 
announced and implemented in the same year, this type of robustness check would not be 
appropriate for this policy. 
Differences with respect to gender 
We will break down the regression between males and females. Before proceeding with 
the regression, it is important to note that including the variable famsize does not explain the 
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variation in log wage any better than it did without. Thus, to keep our regression strong with 
relevant variables, I exclude famsize from all future regressions. 
Coefficient of determination with and without the variable Family Size 
R2 Males Females 
Famsize .145 .1100 
No Famsize .145 .1075 
  
After regressing the modified equation on males, we see for the male sample that the 
effect of the policy on the immigrant decreases their wage growth by about 0.04 percentage 
points (Table 4). Nonetheless, the interaction term of a male immigrant after 2012 is not 
statistically significant. This finding is also present in the female-only sample, where immigrant 
females after 2012 experienced a wage growth increase in .03 percentage points. Although 
immigrant males experienced a wage decrease and immigrant females experienced a wage 
increase after the year 2012, the log wage difference between genders is not enough to conclude 
that DACA had a more profound effect on one gender or another for the immigrant population. 
This opposing trend in wages can be a result of females being more likely to take on household 
labor, especially if they are married, in comparison to the males of the group. 
Race 
In order to see if there’s an impact of log wage dependent on race, I first look between 
whites and non-whites to see if there's an impact on wage growth. Here, I created a difference-in-
difference-in-difference model (DDD) where I interacted 1) an immigrant 2) after 2012 with 3) 
their race to see if there existed a change in wage growth there. In this dataset, a respondent who 
did not identify as primarily white identified generally as: black or African American, Native 
American, Asian, other races, or identifying as two or more races. 80% of this dataset identified 
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themselves as white. I run this to see if there is a disproportionate effect of wage growth on white 
or black workers, both native and non-native, brought on by the policy. 
Looking at Table 5, after running the regression with interaction variables of white, 
immigrant, and after 2012, the resulting coefficient for being a white immigrant in the labor 
force after 2012 is not statistically significant. Using the same technique, I arrive at a similar 
conclusion if we just look at a black immigrant in the labor force after 2012, which is not 
statistically significant either. If this method were to be carried out again, it would be more 
effective to have the individual’s ethnicity as the indicator, since most of the DACA recipients 
are of Hispanic/Latin American origin (USCIS 2020).  
Reducing the sample by age 
Next, I wanted to see if my results still held under the restriction of age in workforce 
participation. Because the policy only applies to those who entered the US before the age of 16 
and age upon application is under 30, I might see some greater result in a younger demographic 
in the labor market. I ran two more regressions – one with a sample of workers under the age of 
30 and the other under the age of 45 (Table 6). For the workers less than age 30, we see that an 
immigrant after the year 2012 will experience a wage growth increase of about 0.03 percentage 
points; for workers less than age 45, we see that an immigrant after the year 2012 will experience 
a wage growth increase of roughly 0.02 percentage points. The results show that both models 
with decreases in the sample size does nothing to the significance of our variable of interest. 
Thus, the model we have remains robust up until now.  
Controlling for states with high volume of DACA recipients 
As a final attempt at a robustness check, I wanted to see if there are impacts based on 
region by DACA recipients. To do so, I swapped the region control for a variable that 
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encapsulates certain states in the US. The majority of DACA recipients are in California, Illinois, 
or Texas. So, in lieu of controlling for region, I created an interaction variable for a person who 
lives in either of those three states and see if it had a significant effect on wages. In this case, I 
made a difference-in-difference-in-difference model where I analyzed what the effect was of 1) 
living in either California, Texas, Illinois 2) as an immigrant 3) past the year 2012 when DACA 
was implemented (Table 7). By including the triple interaction variable, we see that if an 
immigrant lived in one of those three states after 2012, they experienced a loss in wage growth 
by about .091 percentage points, which turns out to be statistically significant. The interaction 
between the California-Texas-Illinois dummy, immigrant dummy, and year 2012 dummy is 
statistically significant, but including this variable does not explain our variable of interest 
(immigrant by year 2012) enough to make it significant. This means that DACA would have 
made the most impact on worker wages by controlling for the three states with a high volume of 
DACA recipients.  
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, I explored the impact of the implementation of DACA on wage growth of 
non-native workers while using native workers as the control group. Past research discusses how 
a shock to labor supply does not necessarily have an impact on the native wage growth, which 
provides sufficient justification for using native wages as a control for the purposes of this 
project. DACA grants undocumented people the ability to pursue work under a permit, so this, 
theoretically, should cause some form of a shift in the labor market supply of immigrant workers. 
If this labor shock was sizable or unanticipated, we should see a more profound impact on wage 
growth. This research focuses on the scenario that DACA recipients, younger than the age of 30 
that arrived to the US before the age of 16, apply for a work permit and enter the labor market 
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under this protected status. Since our dataset is only up to 2016, we can only gauge the 
immediate effect of the entrance. 
After controlling for variables such as age, sex, education, industry, region, and other 
human capital factors, we see that the implementation showed no significant effect of wage 
growth of the non-native workforce. There does not exist a statistically significant impact on 
wage growth between the male and female population, people who identified as white or black, 
or for age. When looking at the workers who live in the three states that house the most DACA 
recipients (California, Texas, and Illinois), we discover that there’s a statistically significant 
effect on wage growth for an immigrant who lives in one of those three states after 2012. This 
finding did not, however, make our original interaction term of interest significant. Therefore, 
through various robustness checks in controlling for gender, race, state, and age, the results are 
robust. 
 There have been a few limitations to this research. Since our data is bounded by four 
years after the policy implementations, it is possible that this research may not fully captured the 
effect of labor market supply shift. This could be from the possibility that someone may be too 
young to enter the labor market that happens to eligible for DACA. Since this relatively a recent 
policy, future research could paint a better picture over a longer period with more demographic 
variables (such as ethnic background). Additionally, as explained in detail in the Data section, 
the ACS does a poor job of accurately portraying the citizenship status of a selected person, as 
misreporting is high among immigrants who report fewer than five years in the US and Mexican 
men described by Van Hook and Bachmeier (2013). Because this research heavily depended on 
citizenship as a variable in determining someone’s wage, the results of this research is best taken 
at face value. A dataset that details a person’s citizenship status more thoroughly (and perhaps 
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more accurately) is the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Future researchers 
are encouraged to utilize other datasets to obtain a more comprehensive picture of wage growth 
dependent on citizenship status more thoroughly explained in other datasets. Additionally, it 
would be very interesting to see how the labor market is impacted by the entrance of DACA 
recipients who pursued higher education and thereby gained skills that could not otherwise have 
been obtained entering the labor market without education. 
 From our results, we see that the implementation of DACA does not have a negative 
effect on wage growth for an immigrant working after the policy’s enaction. In other words, this 
policy to better the wellbeing and give opportunities to a vulnerable population is not at the 
expense of another group that has already occupied the labor market. Though the addition of this 
policy may not necessarily result in increased wages in a labor market demography, it certainly 
does not show evidence of decreasing wages over time. Using the argument that revoking this 
policy is in the interest of the American workers is not enough justification to remove DACA, 
and through these results we see that DACA’s implementation does not significantly affect non-
native workers either unless they were in the three states that house the most DACA-mented. 
 In conclusion, I hope that future presidential administrations recognize the tireless efforts 
of the undocumented immigrants who work for a better life for themselves. Though their 
presence is small in numbers, undocumented workers have made a huge impact to the labor 
market, and not to the detriment of other non-native workers. Just like how they support the US 
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VIII. Tables and Graphs 
 
  
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Natives and Non-Natives between 2010 and 2014 
Variables 2010 2014 
 Native Non-Native Native Non-Native 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Weekly Wage 10,926 6,596 9,010 1,757 6,925 11,836 10,611 7,046 10,586 1,682 7,124 9,623 
             
Age 10,926 45.78 15.42 1,757 43.68 13 10,611 44.5 16.1 1,682 45.32 13.75 
Female 10,926 0.494 0.499 1,757 0.46 0.498 10,611 0.494 0.5 1,682 0.465 0.498 
Married 10,926 0.544 0.498 1,757 0.623 0.484 10,611 0.528 0.5 1,682 0.636 0.481 
Speak English 10,926 0.997 0.056 1,757 0.759 0.427 10,611 0.997 0.049 1,682 0.777 0.416 
Education             
College Degree 10,926 0.317 0.465 1,757 0.312 0.464 10,611 0.319 0.466 1,682 0.345 0.476 
Some College 10,926 0.263 0.44 1,757 0.209 0.407 10,611 0.264 0.441 1,682 0.205 0.403 
High School Deg or 
GED 10,926 0.168 0.374 1,757 0.099 0.299 10,611 0.17 0.376 1,682 0.096 0.296 
Race             
White 10,926 0.842 0.365 1,757 0.454 0.498 10,611 0.843 0.364 1,682 0.75 0.499 
Black/African 
American 10,926 0.103 0.303 1,757 0.088 0.285 10,611 0.096 0.295 1,682 0.088 0.284 
American Indian or 
Alaska Native 10,926 0.009 0.092 1,757 0.004 0.063 10,611 0.009 0.094 1,682 0.002 0.042 
Chinese 10,926 0.003 0.053 1,757 0.0739 0.262 10,611 0.004 0.064 1,682 0.065 0.247 
Japanese 10,926 0.002 0.047 1,757 0.0102 0.101 10,611 0.002 0.044 1,682 0.007 0.081 
Other Asian or Pacific 
Islander 10,926 0.009 0.098 1,757 0.197 0.398 10,611 0.009 0.096 1,682 0.231 0.421 
Other Race 10,926 0.014 0.116 1,757 0.143 0.35 10,611 0.017 0.128 1,682 0.113 0.317 
Two Major Races 10,926 0.016 0.127 1,757 0.026 0.158 10,611 0.017 0.131 1,682 0.02 0.141 
Three or More Major 
Races 10,926 0.002 0.042 1,757 0.003 0.053 10,611 0.003 0.051 1,682 0.004 0.059 
Region             
New England Division 10,926 0.052 0.224 1,757 0.044 0.206 10,611 0.052 0.222 1,682 0.047 0.211 
Middle Atlantic 
Division 10,926 0.129 0.336 1,757 0.159 0.366 10,611 0.137 0.343 1,682 0.162 0.368 
East North Central 
Div. 10,926 0.166 0.372 1,757 0.081 0.272 10,611 0.157 0.364 1,682 0.078 0.269 
West North Central 
Div. 10,926 0.079 0.271 1,757 0.017 0.129 10,611 0.079 0.269 1,682 0.027 0.161 
South Atlantic 
Division 10,926 0.191 0.393 1,757 0.195 0.396 10,611 0.197 0.398 1,682 0.191 0.393 
East South-Central 
Div. 10,926 0.063 0.245 1,757 0.015 0.123 10,611 0.066 0.249 1,682 2050 0.141 
West South-Central 
Div. 10,926 0.113 0.316 1,757 0.116 0.319 10,611 0.107 0.309 1,682 0.106 0.308 
Mountain Division 10,926 0.072 0.258 1,757 0.07 0.255 10,611 0.07 0.256 1,682 0.057 0.233 
Pacific Division 10,926 0.132 0.339 1,757 0.303 0.459 10,611 0.135 0.342 1,682 0.311 0.463 
Note: Summary statistics between native and non-native born workers between the years 2010 and 2014. The race, region, and industry (Table 3) 
will be the control variables.   
Due to limited observations for each industrial category, I have placed the summary statistics for the industrial code on a separate table.  
The race, region, and industry categories will be our control variable. Hourly wage is the dependent variable, but we will be regressing on lwage in 
our model for wage growth.  
Source: American Community Survey (ACS) 2000-2016 
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Table 2: Industry Distribution between Natives and Immigrant Workers, 2000-2016 
 Natives Immigrants 
Industry Type Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Percent Cumulative 
1 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and 
Hunting, and Mining 
69,575 35.71% 35.71% 10,083 36.16% 36.16% 
2 Wholesale Trade 4,541 2.33% 38.04% 779 2.79% 38.95% 
3 Retail Trade 18,601 9.55% 47.59% 2,259 8.10% 47.05% 
4 Transportation and Warehousing, Utilities 6,302 3.23% 50.83% 979 3.51% 50.56% 
5 Information 3,435 1.76% 52.59% 396 1.42% 51.98% 
6 Finance and Insurance, Real Estate and 
Rental and Leasing 
10,425 5.35% 57.94% 1,348 4.83% 56.82% 
7 Professional, Scientific, and Management, 
and Administration and Waste Management 
Services 
15,815 8.12% 66.06% 2,792 10.01% 66.83% 
8 Educational Services, Healthcare and 
Social Assistance 
35,724 18.34% 84.40% 4,592 16.47% 83.30% 
9 Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, 
Accommodation, and Food Services 
13,980 7.18% 91.57% 2,488 8.92% 92.22% 
10 Other Services except Public 
Administration 
7,247 3.72% 95.29% 1,460 5.24% 97.45% 
11 Public Administration 8,123 4.17% 99.46% 652 2.34% 99.79% 
12 Active Duty Military 1,048 0.54% 100.00% 58 0.21% 100.00% 




Note: This table shows broad industry categories. This is industry distribution between the native and non-native workers seems to be 
mostly similar – there is no single industry where either group has a higher percent concentration in, though the native workers greatly 















Table 3 Initial Model Regression Output 
 (1) (2) 
 Without Controls With Controls Interact with Immigrant 
Immigrant 0.039 -0.144 - 
  (0.017) (0.146)  
Year 2012 0.041 0.021 - 
  (0.011) (0.030)  
Immigrant x Year 2012 0.022 -0.022 - 
  (0.032) (0.030)  
Age - 0.161*** -0.003 
   (0.002) (0.006) 
Age Squared - -0.002*** 0.000* 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Married - 0.180*** -0.227*** 
   (0.012) (0.031) 
Female - -0.324*** -0.246*** 
  (0.010) (0.027) 
Family Size - -0.038*** 0.037*** 
  (0.004) (0.008) 
Speak English - 0.108 0.193** 
   (0.072) (0.079) 
Education -   
College Degree - 0.783*** -0.056 
   (0.014) (0.037) 
Some College - 0.328*** -0.087* 
   (0.015) (0.048) 
High School or GED - 0.064*** -0.007 
   (0.013) (0.037) 
Time Trend (t) - .008*** - 
  (.002)  
Industry  No Yes Yes 
Region No Yes Yes 
Race No Yes Yes 
    
R Squared 0.01% 12.33% 
Observation (N) 222,702 222,702 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, **p < .05, *p < 0.10. Model (1) is a regression with only the treatment and no controls. 
Model (2) has all the controls including each control interacted with the dummy variable for immigrant. The 
variables married, female, speak English, and education section are all probabilities for each individual. Interacted 
with the dummy variable demonstrates the change in wage growth of each variable if identified as an immigrant. 
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Table 4 Differences in Log Wage with respect to Gender. 
Variable Male Female 
Immigrant 0.058** -0.107*** 
 (0.025) (0.029) 
Year 2012 0.077*** -0.063** 
 (0.025) (0.026) 
Immigrant x Year 2012 -0.037 0.033 
 (0.040) (0.045) 
Age 0.161*** 0.159*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Age Squared -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.515*** -0.229*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) 
Speak English 0.143*** 0.372*** 
 (0.035) (0.043) 
Education   
   College Degree 0.854*** 0.711*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
   Some College 0.359*** 0.286*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) 
   High School or GED 0.088*** 0.043** 
 (0.017) (0.003) 
Time  .002 0.020*** 
 (.002) (.003) 
R2 14.50 10.80 
Observation (N) 113,477 109,225 
Note: This regression controls for region, race, and general industry. All the other variables except for the 
variable of interest shows some degree of statistical significance with robust standard errors. 








Table 5 Difference in Wage Growth by Race  
 White   Black 
Variable Coefficient 
Interacted with 
immigrant Variable Coefficient 
Interacted with 
immigrant 
Immigrant 0.190 - Immigrant 0.036 - 
 (0.146)   (0.144)  
Year 2012 0.015 - Year 2012 0.016 - 
 (0.030)   (0.018)  
Immigrant x Year 2012 -0.047 - Immigrant x Year 2012 -0.015 - 
 (0.046)   (0.031)  
White 0.163*** - Black -0.203*** - 
 (0.016)   (0.019)  
White x Immigrant -0.255*** - Black x Immigrant 0.254*** - 
 (0.034)   (0.055)  
White x Year 2012 0.006 - Black x Year 2012 0.034 - 
 (0.029)   (0.037)  
White x Immigrant x Year 
2012 0.056 - 
Black x Immigrant x Year 
2012 -0.068 - 
 (0.063)   (0.101)  
Age 0.161*** -0.005 Age 0.162*** -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.006)  (0.002) (0.006) 
Age Squared -0.002*** 0.000* Age Squared -0.002*** 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Female -0.325*** -0.246*** Female -0.330*** -0.244*** 
 (0.010) (0.027)  (0.010) (0.027) 
Married 0.137*** -0.169*** Married 0.138*** -0.167*** 
 (0.011) (0.029)  (0.011) (0.029) 
Speak English 0.085 0.201*** Speak English 0.118* 0.164** 
 (0.072) (0.078)  (0.072) (0.079) 
Education   Education   
    College Degree 0.795*** -0.050     College Degree 0.797* -0.046 
 (0.014) (0.036)  (0.014) (0.036) 
    Some College 0.333*** -0.090*     Some College 0.334*** -0.093** 
 (0.015) (0.048)  (0.015) (0.048) 
    High School or GED 0.065*** -0.006     High School or GED 0.067*** -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.037)  (0.013) (0.037) 
Time Trend (t) 0.008***  Time Trend (t) 0.008***  
 (0.002)   (.002)  
R Squared 12.28 R Squared 12.27 
Observation (N) 222,702 Observation (N) 222,702 
Notes: For this regression, I kept the same sample as the initial regression, only this time I have included a dummy variable if the individual was 
white or black. I used that dummy to interact with our variable of interest- the immigrant after the year 2012. This regression also controls for 
broad industry categories and region. This regression also includes controls for region and broad industry code. Our variables of interest are 
immigrant x year 2012, and the races interacted with the immigrant x year 2012. The third and sixth column is the variable interacted with the 
immigrant variable dummy, and these interactions were in one regression with respect to race. 




Table 6 Reducing the Sample by Age 
 Age less than 30 Age less than 45 









Immigrant 1.709* - 0.814*** -  
(1.020)  (0.297) 
 
Year 2012 0.036 - 0.023 -  
(0.030)  (0.021) 
 
Immigrant*year 2012 0.029 - 0.016 -  
(.058)  (0.037) 
 
Age 0.436*** -0.149* 0.175*** -0.049***  
(0.023) (0.085) (0.006) (0.018) 
Age Squared -0.007*** 0.002* -0.0022*** 0.001***  
(0.000) (0.002) (0.00009) (0.000) 
Female -0.221*** 0.004 -0.401*** -0.242***  
(0.016) (0.060) (0.0117) (0.033) 
Married 0.087*** 0.147** 0.148*** -0.196***  
(0.021) (0.069) (0.0134) (0.035) 
Speak English 0.116 0.080 0.176 0.088  
(0.110) (0.126) (0.0823) (0.091) 
Education   
  
    College Degree 0.789*** -0.065 0.878*** -0.103**  
(0.024) (0.074) (0.0165) (0.045) 
    Some College 0.315*** -0.031 0.377*** -0.129**  
(0.024) (0.088) (0.0178) (0.058) 
    High School Degree or GED 0.114*** 0.061 0.104*** -0.045  
(0.021) (0.064) (0.0158) (0.043) 
Time Trend (t) -0.001 - 0.006*** - 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  
R2 13.1% 12.5% 
Observations (N) 54,947 123,308 
Note: Regression also controls for region, race, and general industry code. (refer to table 5) 
a. Dummy variables are female, married, speak English. Education variables shows probability that the individual 
has that level of education. 





Table 7 Control for Top Three States of DACA Recipients 
Variable  Coefficient  
Variable Standalone Interacted with immig 
immigrant -0.017 -  
(0.144)  
year 2012 0.016 -  
(0.019)  
immigrant*year 2012 0.009 -  
(0.0361)  
California-Texas-Illinois (CTI) -0.016 - 
 (0.013)  
CTI*Year2012 0.091 - 
 (0.027)  
CTI*Immigrant*year2012 -0.091* - 
 (0.054)  
Age 0.162*** -0.004  
(0.002) (0.006) 
Age squared -0.002*** 0.000*  
(0.000) (0.000) 
Female -0.326*** -0.243***  
(0.010) (0.027) 
Married 0.132*** -0.184***  
(0.011) (0.029) 
Speak English 0.111 0.202**  
(0.072) (0.078) 
Education   
    College Degree 0.804*** -0.063*  
(0.014) (0.037) 
    Some College 0.340*** -0.093*  
(0.015) (0.048) 
    High School Degree or GED 0.073*** -0.005  
(0.013) (0.036) 
Time Trend (t) 0.008*** - 
 (0.002)  
R2 12.2% 
Observations (N) 222,702 
Note: Regression also controls for region, race, and general industry code. 
a. Dummy variables are female, married, speak English. Education variables shows probability that the individual 
has that level of education. 
b. ***p < 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p < 0.10 
 
